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Abstract 
This paper investigates how critical-peak pricing (CPP) affects households with 
different usage and income levels, with the goal of informing policy makers who are 
considering the implementation of CPP tariffs in the residential sector. Using a subset of 
data from the California Statewide Pricing Pilot of 2003-2004, average load change 
during summer events, annual percent bill change, and post-experiment satisfaction 
ratings are calculated across six customer segments, categorized by historical usage and 
income levels. Findings show that high-use customers respond significantly more in kW 
reduction than do low-use customers, while low-use customers save significantly more in 
percentage reduction of annual electricity bills than do high-use customers – results that 
challenge the strategy of targeting only high-use customers for CPP tariffs. Across 
income levels, average load and bill changes were statistically indistinguishable, as were 
satisfaction rates – results that are compatible with a strategy of full-scale implementation 
of CPP rates in the residential sector. Finally, the high-use customers earning less than 
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$50,000 annually were the most likely of the groups to see bill increases – about 5% saw 
bill increases of 10% or more – suggesting that any residential CPP implementation 
might consider targeting this customer group for increased energy efficiency efforts. 
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1. Introduction 
Between May 2000 and June 2001, peak wholesale prices on the California spot 
electricity market sustained record highs, and capacity shortages were frequent. While 
factors leading up to the onset of the California electricity crisis are complex, there is 
reasonable consensus that the lack of real-time response by retail demand was a major 
contributor to its severity and duration (Borenstein, 2002; Jurewitz, 2002; Woo, 2001; 
Woo et al., 2003). Since that time, increasing real-time demand response to electricity 
price changes by strengthening the real-time price link between wholesale and retail 
markets has become an explicit policy goal at both state and national levels. In California, 
policy makers have set a goal for 2007 of meeting 5% of peak demand with a price-
responsive load (California Energy Commission, 2004). At the national level, the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 states that it is now “the policy of the United States that time-based 
pricing and other forms of demand response…shall be encouraged, the deployment of 
such technology and devices that enable electricity customers to participate in such 
pricing and demand response systems shall be facilitated, and unnecessary barriers to 
demand response participation in energy, capacity and ancillary service markets shall be 
eliminated.”  
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Historically, utilities have used two strategies to reduce residential peak load: 
direct load-control (DLC) programs and time-of-use (TOU) tariffs. Direct load-control 
programs, which have existed in California since the early 1980s, offer households 
recurring monthly bill credits in exchange for utility control of large electrical end uses, 
most commonly central air conditioning. One reason for the popularity of DLC programs 
is that, unlike price-based demand response programs, DLC programs are feasible with 
the existing metering infrastructure.  
While effective in providing load relief when warranted by capacity shortage, 
DLC programs may be seen as inequitable for three reasons. First, DLC programs are 
voluntary, offering fixed financial incentives for unmeasured load reductions. This 
encourages adverse selection that results in “free riders” – participants who provide little 
to no load relief during load-control events, but still benefit as much as do those 
providing significant load reductions. Second, although customers without central air 
conditioning do not cause system peak demand surges on hot days, they are not eligible 
for program benefits. Third, when payments to participants exceed system benefits, these 
same customers must suffer higher electricity rates to pay for the bill savings enjoyed by 
the program participants.  
The other common residential peak reduction strategy in use today is voluntary 
TOU pricing. TOU tariffs typically have high peak prices on weekday afternoons and 
lower off-peak prices for the remaining hours of the week. Experimentation with TOU 
rates in the residential sector indicates that TOU prices flatten load shapes by decreasing 
usage in the high-price periods and increasing usage in the low-price periods (Atkinson, 
1979; Caves and Christensen, 1980; Caves et al., 1984; Herriges et al., 1984). The 
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shortcoming of TOU tariffs is that they do not provide additional incentives to reduce 
demand further on days when the system is most stressed, because they reflect only long-
term average expectations of daily peak marginal costs (Crew et al., 1995). 
The potential shortcomings of DLC programs and TOU tariffs, combined with the 
decreasing cost and increasing functionality of electricity meters, have prompted growing 
interest in encouraging peak reductions through dynamic rates. By more closely linking 
short-term wholesale and retail electricity prices, tariffs based on dynamic rates provide 
the reliability benefits of peak load reductions, while improving the allocation of 
electricity procurement costs among residential customers with diverse demands 
(Borenstein, 2002; Braithwait and Faruqui, 2001; Hirst, 2002; Kueck et al., 2001).  
More than any other retail electricity rate structure, real-time pricing (RTP) 
closely tracks time-dependent marginal wholesale costs. Hourly RTP tariffs have been 
implemented successfully for large industrial and commercial firms (Taylor et al., 2005). 
Notwithstanding the long-run efficiency benefits of RTP (Borenstein, 2005), policy 
makers generally consider hourly RTP too complex for small electricity users and are 
thus reluctant to allow residential customers to face the inherently volatile wholesale 
market. An exception to this generalization can be found in Illinois, where state 
legislation has recently prompted the first RTP option for residential customers (2006).  
Where dynamic rates are being considered, but RTP is deemed infeasible for 
residential customers, a reasonable alternative is critical-peak pricing (CPP). CPP tariffs 
augment a time-invariant or TOU rate structure with a dispatchable high or “critical” 
price during periods of system stress. The critical price can occur for a limited number of 
discretionary days per year, or when system or market conditions meet pre-defined 
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criteria. Participating customers receive notification of the dispatchable high price, 
typically a day in advance, and in some cases are provided with automated control 
technologies to support efficient load drop. Because all of the prices in a CPP rate are 
preset, CPP is not as economically efficient as RTP; this same characteristic, however, 
also makes CPP politically more appealing, because it diminishes the potentially large 
price risk associated with RTP. 
Empirical evidence supports the view that CPP can achieve significant load 
reductions during critical periods. In California, households supplied with sophisticated 
end-use controls dropped an average of 41% of baseline load (i.e., load that would have 
occurred absent the CPP price signal) over 2-hour hot-weather CPP events. In the 
absence of end-use controls, households dropped an average of 13% of baseline load over 
5-hour hot-weather CPP events (Herter et al., 2006). 
While the effectiveness of residential CPP in California to deliver load reduction 
appears certain, there is an on-going debate as to whether to implement CPP, because 
how to do so remains controversial. The objective of this paper is to provide empirical 
evidence that aids in the decision about which, if any, CPP implementation schemes 
might be considered for the residential sector.  
The analysis described here uses data from 457 residences, determined to be 
representative of California households (see Appendix), that participated in the California 
Statewide Pricing Pilot (SPP) of 2003 and 2004. Average load changes during summer 
events, annual bill changes, and post-experiment satisfaction values are calculated across 
six customer segments, categorized by historical usage and income level.  
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The analysis shows that high-use customers respond significantly more, in kW 
reduction, than do low-use customers, while low-use customers save significantly more, 
in percentage reduction of annual electricity bills, than do high-use customers. For equity 
reasons, these results challenge the strategy of targeting only high-use customers for CPP 
tariffs.  
Across income levels, average load and bill changes were statistically 
indistinguishable, as were satisfaction rates – results that are compatible with a strategy 
of full-scale implementation of CPP rates in the residential sector. Finally, the high-use 
customers earning less than $50,000 annually were the most likely of the groups to see 
bill increases – about 5% saw bill increases of 10% or more – suggesting that any 
residential CPP implementation might consider targeting this customer group for 
increased energy efficiency efforts. 
2. The CPP implementation problem 
The three primary criteria for designing sound rate structures are capital 
attraction, consumer rationing, and fairness to ratepayers (Bonbright et al., 1988). Capital 
attraction, or meeting revenue requirements, can be accomplished through proper design 
of nearly any tariff structure, including those based on time-invariant, TOU, CPP or RTP 
rates. The consumer rationing objective requires rates that assign resources to those who 
value them above the marginal cost of their provision. If, in the short term, this demand 
exceeds supply, then resources should be assigned to those who value them the most. In 
theory, CPP rates that are designed to more closely reflect short-term wholesale 
electricity costs meet this criterion better than do time-invariant or TOU rates, but not as 
well as do RTP rates. The final objective, fairness to ratepayers, obligates utilities to 
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distribute revenue requirements fairly among ratepayers, such that equals are treated 
equally, and unequals are treated unequally. Under time-invariant rates, customers with 
low peak to off-peak ratios subsidize those with high peak to off-peak ratios. Thus, this 
third objective can better be met through rates that more closely reflect time-varying 
wholesale costs, because they more accurately apportion costs according to the hour and 
day of use.  
Where CPP and RTP tend to fall into doubt is in the “practical” attributes of 
“simplicity, certainty, convenience of payment, economy in collection, understandability, 
public acceptability, and feasibility of application” (Bonbright et al., 1988). Where these 
attributes are uncertain or not met, two strategies are commonly used to enhance them. 
Dynamic tariffs can be targeted to those customer segments likely to have a high demand 
response. Alternatively or at the same time, the tariff might be offered as a "voluntary” or 
"default" (rather than mandatory) tariff, allowing customers to "opt in" or "opt out" of the 
new tariff. These policy decisions are discussed in greater detail in the next two sub-
sections. 
2.1. Full-scale vs. targeted tariffs 
To improve cost effectiveness, CPP tariffs can be required of or offered to only 
those customers who are most likely to contribute load relief. This is typically seen as a 
win-win situation, providing utilities with improved cost effectiveness and participants 
with lower bills. For example, consumer advocates in California have proposed that CPP 
rates be targeted to the largest residential users of electricity, who, they say, are likely to 
have the greatest demand response and greatest bill savings, thus improving customer 
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acceptance, reducing adverse bill impacts, and improving cost effectiveness in 
comparison to a class-wide rate.  
While this strategy is intuitively appealing, the implied relationships between 
customer size, demand response and bill effects are not obvious. Before deciding whether 
targeting is an appropriate strategy, one should first determine whether the customer class 
can be easily divided into meaningful segments that respond differentially. Given 
significantly different response rates, one must then ascertain the differential bill impacts 
of these same customer segments. If customers that are more responsive benefit 
financially, while those that are less responsive lose financially, targeted implementation 
might be a sound strategy, all else being equal. If these relationships do not hold, 
however, equity concerns might discount the use of targeting to improve cost 
effectiveness.  
This decision process is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the combined effect 
of customer response and bill savings on the decision to target tariffs to only high-use 
customers. If high-use customers do not respond more than low-use customers in 
absolute terms, then targeting will not improve the cost effectiveness of the tariff. If high-
use customers respond significantly more and save proportionally less on their electricity 
bills than do low-use customers, the use of targeting to improve cost effectiveness is 
challenged by equity issues. If high-use customers respond significantly more and save 
proportionally more on their electricity bills than do low-use customers, then the use of 
targeting to improve cost effectiveness is not challenged by these criteria – which is not 
to say that targeting is recommended. That is, meeting the criteria is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for recommending the use of targeting, since a cost-effective 
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response by low-customers, no matter how small, might still warrant full-scale 
implementation.  
This study does not include an explicit cost effectiveness analysis, which requires 
that the energy cost savings exceed the CPP implementation costs. Where local 
distribution companies have already decided to install an advanced metering infra-
structure (AMI), incremental costs include billing and marketing costs. The costs avoided 
by CPP implementation include energy and capacity cost savings due to household load 
reduction. Given the complexities specific to each potential tariff design and 
implementation (Baskette et al., 2006), this issue is well beyond the scope of the present 
study. 
Figure 1. Decision process for customer targeting 
Targeting 
challenged 
Targeting not 
challenged 
yes
no
High-use customers 
save more money than 
low-use customers? 
High-use customers 
respond more than 
low-use customers? 
no 
yes 
 
2.2. Mandatory vs. default or voluntary tariffs 
If the primary objectives of implementing CPP are customer rationing and 
fairness to ratepayers, without respect to customer acceptance or cost effectiveness, then 
full-scale mandatory CPP participation seems the obvious choice. Under this scheme, all 
customers face the same high prices during critical hours, irrespective of customer 
characteristics. This implementation scheme is generally considered politically difficult, 
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inviting strong objection because of the significant departure from the status quo of the 
time-invariant tariffs that now exist in California (Hartman et al., 1991). 
When low or uncertain customer acceptance levels foretell potential political 
backlash from full-scale mandatory implementation, rates offered on a voluntary (opt in) 
or default (opt out) basis can be safer alternatives. In both cases, customers are given at 
least one rate choice besides CPP, allowing those that are unhappy with the new tariff to 
choose another. In the case of voluntary tariffs, customers must actively choose to switch 
or “opt in” to the new CPP tariff. In the case of default tariffs, customers are 
automatically placed on the new tariff, and must actively choose to switch or “opt out” to 
an alternative tariff that mimics the status quo.  
The tradeoff between default and voluntary tariffs is mainly one of participation 
rates. In California, the initial opt-in rate for the SPP was 20% with a sign-up bonus. At 
the end of the pilot, about half of these CPP participants chose to remain on the CPP rate 
in absence of a participation payment, suggesting a voluntary participation rate of less 
than 10% for CPP tariffs. In Washington State, time-differentiated tariffs offered on an 
opt-out basis enjoyed participation rates of about 90% (Faruqui and George, 2003).  
The potential costs of increased customer acceptance for default or voluntary CPP 
tariffs with respect to mandatory CPP tariffs are twofold. First, peak-demand reductions 
are almost certainly lower than what could be achieved with 100% participation. Second, 
voluntary CPP tariffs could encourage adverse self-selection such that households with 
low peak to off-peak ratios benefit from time-varying rates, while those with high peak to 
off-peak ratios benefit from time-invariant rates (Hartway et al., 1999; Horowitz and 
Woo, 2006). This situation might cause shortfalls in a utility's cost recovery or violate the 
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primary objective of fairness to ratepayers unless the tariff alternatives properly reflect 
risk premiums. Furthermore, while default and opt-in tariffs might have better initial 
customer acceptance, high overall satisfaction rates for both the SPP and the Washington 
rates provide evidence that long-term customer satisfaction might hinge more on the 
structure of the rate and customer service than the initial subscription circumstances. 
Although the choices among mandatory, default and voluntary rates are complex, 
one of the important factors needed to guide this decision is expected customer 
acceptance of the proposed new tariff. If customer acceptance is expected to be high, the 
relative benefits of mandatory implementation might warrant its consideration. If 
customer acceptance is expected to be low or to vary substantially across important 
customer segments, default or voluntary tariffs might be safer policy choices. Ultimately, 
perceived bill effects might also affect the sustainability of a tariff through longer-term 
customer acceptance; thus some policy makers require evidence that customer bill 
impacts will not be large.  
Figure 2 illustrates some of the conditions influencing decisions about mandatory 
implementation. The decision involves weighing the administrative ease and demand-
response benefits of mandatory tariffs against the potential customer backlash. If high-
income customers are likely to save significantly more on their electricity bills than low-
income customers, then welfare considerations could make mandatory implementation 
politically difficult. At the same time, if certain customer segments are more dissatisfied 
with the program than are other customer segments, potential customer backlash might 
preclude mandatory implementation. If neither adverse bill effects nor satisfaction levels 
differ across customer segments, mandatory implementation is not challenged. This is not 
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sufficient evidence, however, to recommend mandatory implementation either, since such 
a decision must take into consideration economic and political considerations not 
addressed here. 
Figure 2. Decision process for mandatory implementation 
Mandatory 
implementation 
not challenged 
Mandatory 
implementation 
challenged 
yes
no
Differential 
satisfaction 
levels? 
High-income customers 
benefit more than  
low-income customers? 
no
yes
 
 
3. Approach and Results 
To shed light on the implementation choices described above, this paper uses 
load, billing and satisfaction data from 457 residential CPP customers, shown to be 
representative of the California population (see Appendix), to answer the following 
questions. 
1. Does response to CPP events vary across household types? If all households 
provide an equal amount of load relief, targeting does not have the potential to 
improve the cost effectiveness of the rate.  
2. Do electricity-bill impacts vary across household types? The answer to this 
question depends on the structure of the pre-existing tariff and the new CPP 
tariff. CPP rates are designed to be revenue neutral, meaning that bills will not 
change for non-responding households with a usage pattern identical to the 
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class average. Revenue neutrality, however, does not perfectly preempt 
adverse bill impacts. Customers with high peak to off-peak consumption 
ratios relative to the class average are likely to see a bill increase if they do not 
respond to the higher peak and critical-peak prices. If adverse bill impacts are 
focused on particularly sensitive customer classes, for example low-income 
households, mandatory CPP might be viewed as being regressive, and thus 
politically unsustainable. In addition, favorable bill impacts on low-use 
households would challenge the strategy of targeting only high-use customers. 
3. Does customer satisfaction with CPP vary across household types? Previous 
studies have shown relatively high customer satisfaction with the CPP rates 
tested in the SPP (Momentum Market Intelligence, 2004). If this high 
customer acceptance is not distributed equally across all household types, a 
mandatory implementation scheme might be considered undesirable. 
Given the interest in usage and welfare effects, both historical electricity usage 
and income levels are used to divide the residential class. Although electricity 
consumption is generally presumed to increase with income, an exploratory analysis of 
the relationship between usage and income indicates that, in the sample of 457 SPP 
customers, income levels explain less than 8% of household electricity consumption 
(Figure 3). In this sample, at least, a substantial number of low-income households are 
high-use customers and a substantial portion of high-income households are low-use 
customers.  
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Figure 3. Historical monthly summer usage and income 
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Historical usage values, provided by the three California utilities, are average monthly kWh usage values measured during the summer 
of 2002. Income levels are taken from a survey distributed in 2003, before the SPP began. Participants chose from six possible 
household income levels: less than $25,000, $25,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $74,999, $75,000 to $99,999, $100,000 to $149,999, and 
$150,000 or more. For analytical purposes, these values were recoded as $15,000 for the lowest income level, $175,000 for the highest 
income level, and at the range mid-points for the remaining income levels.  
 
The low correlation (R2 = 0.079) between income and historical summer usage 
suggests that the analysis requires a finer delineation of customers ,prompting a division 
of the data sample into the six groups shown in Table 1. The remainder of this section 
presents the mean satisfaction, response, and bill-change values for each group based on 
empirical evidence from the SPP experiment. 
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3.1. Does response to CPP events vary across household types?  
Load reduction during CPP events is critical for a tariff implementation where 
demand response is a stated policy goal. Previous analysis of SPP data has reported 
significant load reductions during CPP events (Herter et al., 2006). Determination of 
whether a CPP tariff targeted to high-use customers might be more cost effective than a 
full-scale tariff implies investigating how load reductions vary across customers with 
different historical consumption levels. Further division by income-level categories 
provides initial insight into whether low-income homes might be disproportionately 
affected by CPP rates. The results of the analysis are presented in Figure 4.  
Figure 4. Mean household kW change across 12 CPP events, July through September 2004 
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Mean peak-load change is the average difference between the actual and baseline loads, where baseline load is an estimate of the load 
that would have occurred in the absence of a CPP event. Actual and baseline loads are estimated for each customer using regression 
techniques described in (Herter, 2006). 
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 Figure 4 shows that kW response differs substantially between customers using 
less than 600 kWh per summer month and those using at least 600 kWh per summer 
month. Overall, kW response by low-use customers (shown by the diamond pattern) is 
not statistically different from zero, while high-use customers (shown by the square 
pattern) reduce loads by a statistically-significant amount during CPP events (α = 0.05, 
the standard adopted throughout the paper). This provides evidence that, given similar 
per-customer administrative and marketing costs, a rate targeted at high-use customers 
has the potential to be more cost-effective than a full-scale program.1  
In the low-use category, response levels are statistically indistinguishable across 
the three income levels. In the high-use category, the low-income ($0-$24,999) and 
middle-income ($25,000-$49,999) responses do not differ significantly from the high-
income (≥$50,000) response. These results provide preliminary evidence that low-income 
and middle-income customers might not be unduly disadvantaged by CPP rates, since 
they respond as much as or more than do high-income customers at the same usage level. 
This finding is preliminary because load reduction during CPP events is only part of the 
bill-change equation. Differences in daily load shapes are likely to have a more 
pronounced effect on bill changes than will load changes occurring just a few times per 
year. To further investigate this issue, the following section addresses bill changes by 
customer type. 
                                                 
1 An analysis of differential administrative and marketing costs is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
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3.2. Do electricity-bill impacts vary across household types? 
Knowledge of distributional bill impacts or the lack thereof is a critical input into 
the initial decision of whether and how to implement CPP. This information is important 
because bill-change estimates help identify potential winners and losers. A CPP design 
that benefits a few at the expense of many has little chance of customer acceptance and 
regulatory approval.  
Using calculations provided by the SPP sponsoring utilities, the bill-change value 
used in this analysis is calculated as (x-y)/y, where x is the dollar amount of the CPP bill 
and y is the dollar amount that would have been billed under the otherwise applicable 
tariff, given the same usage. The results, presented in Figure 5, show that the overall 
mean bill change for both high and low-usage customers is significantly less than zero (α 
= 0.05), meaning that, on average, the SPP participants save money through CPP rates. 
Moreover, low-usage customers save proportionally more money on a CPP tariff than do 
high-usage customers. Across income levels, mean bill-change values are statistically 
indistinguishable. These results imply that (1) customers, on average, save money on 
CPP rates, (2) low-usage customers save proportionally more than do high-use 
customers, and (3) savings are statistically indistinguishable across income levels. 
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Figure 5. Mean annual change in electricity bills 
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Bill change is the utility-calculated difference between the average monthly bills sent out between October 1, 2003 and September 30, 
2004 under the CPP tariff and what would have been billed under the old tariff given the same consumption pattern, divided by the 
latter. Thus, this variable represents the percentage bill change under the new tariff with respect to the old tariff.  
 
While the results in Figure 5 affirm that CPP does not cause adverse bill impacts 
on average, they also imply that some customer types are more likely to see a bill 
increase due to CPP implementation. In particular, the insignificant bill savings for the 
low-income ($0-$24,999) and middle income ($25,000-$49,999) customer segments in 
the high-use category warranted further investigation. A closer look at the individual 
billing data showed that 5.0% of these customers saw bill increases of more than 10%. 
Based on these findings, future CPP rate policies might consider providing assistance to 
these customers for appliance and building efficiency measures. 
 18
3.3. Does customer satisfaction with CPP vary across household types? 
In planning a new tariff, it is important to test customer reaction to its 
implementation. Low customer acceptance can engender public and political backlash, 
while high customer acceptance can mean smooth adoption. Unfortunately, asking people 
how they might react to a hypothetical rate is unlikely to provide accurate answers.  
For this analysis satisfaction ratings given by customers actually exposed to CPP 
rates were used as predictors of acceptance levels. Figure 6 shows the average 
satisfaction ratings for the six groups of customers, organized by usage and income level. 
The average ratings, ranging from 7.7 to 8.3 out of a maximum of 10 points, are slightly 
higher for low-use customers than for high-use customers, but the difference across usage 
is statistically insignificant. Likewise, satisfaction ratings across income levels are 
statistically indistinguishable. These results imply that customer satisfaction with CPP 
tariffs is high and does not vary significantly across income or usage levels.  
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Figure 6. Mean customer satisfaction ratings from a post-experiment survey 
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The variable satisfaction is taken from a post-experiment survey of about one-third of the CPP participants. This variable contains 
responses to the question: “Overall, how satisfied are you with the new pricing program?” Respondents were directed to rate the 
program using a number between 1 and 10, where 1 was “very dissatisfied” and 10 was “very satisfied.”  
 
4. Conclusions 
We conclude by applying the empirical evidence presented above to analyze the 
choices of tariff implementation. The analysis of load change during CPP events 
presented here indicates that high-use customers respond significantly more than do low-
use customers. On average, low-use customers (those using on average less that 600 kWh 
during summer 2002 months) dropped 0.024 kWh/h during CPP events, while high-use 
customers (those using on average at least 600 kWh during summer 2002 months) 
dropped 0.208 kWh/h during CPP events. In contrast, the analysis of CPP customer bill 
change indicates that low-use customers saved an average of 4.0% on their electricity 
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bills, while high-use customers saved an average of only 1.7%. These results suggest that 
targeting high-use customers to improve the cost effectiveness of CPP tariffs is 
challenged by equity concerns: those who would benefit most from the tariff should not 
be excluded from participation or marketing efforts (Figure 7). 
Figure 7. Results for the targeting decision 
Targeting 
challenged 
Targeting not 
challenged 
yes
no
High-use customers 
save more money than 
low-use customers? 
High-use customers 
respond more than 
low-use customers? 
no 
yes 
 
 
The bill-savings analysis also showed that on average low-income customers did 
not pay more under CPP tariffs, and that savings across income levels were statistically 
indistinguishable. In addition, satisfaction rates across all customer segments were 
uniformly high, averaging between 7.7 and 8.3 out of a maximum of 10. Combined these 
results are compatible with a policy of mandatory implementation (Figure 8). This does 
not, however, imply that mandatory implementation is recommended by these results, 
since economic and political considerations, which differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 
are not addressed here. 
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Figure 8. Results for the mandatory implementation decision 
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Moreover, the bill savings of the two lowest-income levels in the high-use group 
were statistically indistinguishable from zero, while the remaining six groups showed 
statistically significant savings. To offset this disparity, those considering full-scale CPP 
rates might focus efficiency and education efforts on high-use, low-income customers. 
The overall conclusion from the above analysis is that CPP can be considered for 
a voluntary, default or mandatory electric tariff implementation without concern for 
differential impacts by income or electricity usage. As a voluntary tariff, care should be 
taken to ensure minimization of cross-tariff subsidies, since those expecting to pay more 
on CPP rates are likely to choose to remain on time-invariant rates. Although the 
voluntary pilot study investigated here received uniformly high satisfaction ratings across 
customer segments, consideration of a mandatory CPP tariff should be particularly wary 
of customer and political backlash. Consideration of CPP as a default tariff, having 
elements of both mandatory and voluntary tariffs, must address both of these issues. 
There is no obvious reason to think that the group comparisons and major 
conclusions presented in this paper would not hold outside the pilot – to different 
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implementation schemes (e.g. default or mandatory), geographic areas and seasons. In 
contrast, one should be cautious in extrapolating the specific values indicated in this 
paper. Although the customer sample used in this analysis has been shown to be 
representative of the California population based on measured variables (see Appendix), 
there might still be unmeasured variables distinguishing participants from non-
participants. For example, there was no attempt to define or measure any variable, for 
example “agreeableness” or “responsiveness,” that might predispose customers to 
participate in the pilot, respond to prices, and give the program a high satisfaction rating. 
Thus, extrapolation of these values to a voluntary program within California is 
supportable, but extrapolation of these values to any other implementation scheme or 
geographic area should be done with caution. 
Finally, the focus of this paper has been the implementation of CPP tariffs. This 
does not imply that CPP should be implemented to the exclusion of other pricing and 
capacity rationing mechanisms. For example, RTP and properly designed reliability-
differentiation mechanisms can provide important contributions to system operations 
while simultaneously providing increased customer choice (Chao and Wilson, 1987). 
Thus, consideration of CPP implementation should occur in the context of a broader 
demand response portfolio. 
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Appendix: The Statewide Pricing Pilot and Data 
The Statewide Pricing Pilot (SPP) was a result of a joint Rulemaking proceeding 
between the California Energy Commission and the California Public Utilities 
Commission. The SPP was designed and implemented with the help of all three investor-
owned utilities in California: Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Southern California 
Edison, and San Diego Gas and Electric Company. The full pilot study exposed about 
2500 residential and small commercial customers to experimental rates for 15 months 
beginning in July 2003.  
The experimental sample was stratified by four climate zones and three building 
types. Each zone number roughly reflects the climate severity, where Zone 1 has the 
mildest climate, with relatively low summer temperatures, and Zone 4 has the most 
extreme climate, with very high summer temperatures. The three building-type strata 
considered in the experimental design were multi-family homes, single-family high-use 
homes, and single-family low-use homes.  
Potential participants were randomly selected from within each stratum. They 
were then sent enrollment packages and promised a total participation incentive payment 
of $175 over the course of the experiment. About 20% of the customers accepted the 
invitation to participate, 15% declined to participate, and the remaining 65% were 
unreachable or otherwise excluded. Subsequent analyses using mean comparison and 
Heckman correction indicated that the final sample was a representative cross section of 
California residents by appliance holdings, income, education, and 16 other measured 
variables (Charles River Associates, 2004). Furthermore, over the course of the 
experiment, the turnover rate of the treatment groups (21%) was similar to the turnover 
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rate for the primary control groups (22%), suggesting that the CPP rate itself was not 
responsible for the account changes (Charles River Associates, 2005).  
Each experimental CPP tariff consisted of a two-period fixed TOU rate with a 
third “critical-peak” period that could be imposed with a one-day advance notice by 
telephone. Up to 15 critical-peak events could be called during the year, 12 during 
summer and 3 during winter. The underlying TOU peak price was 2 to 3 times the off-
peak price, and the critical-peak price was between five and ten times the off-peak price. 
Both the TOU peak and critical-peak periods were 2 p.m. to 7 p.m.  
All SPP participants were linked to one of 58 California weather stations that 
recorded hourly temperature values. Each participant was also supplied with a new 
electricity meter that collected usage values at 15-minute intervals. The new time-varying 
rates were put into effect on July 1, 2003.  
Although the full pilot study ran from July 2003 through September 2004, the 
load change data are limited to those based on values collected between July 1, 2004 and 
September 30, 2004, so that the results are more indicative of an established summer 
program. The analytic sample used in this study is a subset of the 518 residential SPP 
participants who were on the CPP tariff without end-use controls for at least 30 days in 
the summer of 2004 (Herter, 2006). The subset includes the 457 households for which 
hourly loads, historical usage and income data are available.  
The dataset used in this analysis includes: kw_change, the average hourly load 
change during summer 2004 events (Herter, 2006); bill_change, the average monthly 
percentage electricity-bill change for the year preceding September 30, 2004; income, 
reported annual income level; usage02, historical summer electricity consumption; and 
 28
satisfaction, the program satisfaction rating for each of the 151 customers in the analytic 
sample that also answered the post-pilot survey. The final measures to be used in this 
analysis are shown in Table A1 along with a short description and summary statistics for 
each.  
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Table 1. Analytic sample 
  Sample 
  N % 
Less than 600 kWh/mo 214 47% 
 $0 - $24,999 72 16% 
 $25,000 - $49,999 68 15% 
 ≥$50,000 74 16% 
At least 600 kWh/mo 243 53% 
 $0 - $24,999 37 8% 
 $25,000 - $49,999 47 10% 
 ≥$50,000 159 35% 
Total  457 100% 
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Table A1. Data description 
Variable Data type Description N Share 
(%) 
Unweighted 
Mean 
SD 
kw_change Real Difference between average peak 
baseline and actual electricity use 
(kWh/h) across the 12 event days 
457 100 -0.12 0.51 
bill_change Real Difference between bill under CPP 
tariff and what would have been the 
bill under the old tariff. 
457 100 -$2.07 $7.62 
usage02 Real Average daily summer 2002 
electricity use (kWh)  
457 100 22.4 14.4 
satisfaction Integer Rating from 1=”very dissatisfied” 
to 10=”very satisfied” 
151 33 8.0 2.0 
income1 Boolean Annual income $0 to $24,999 109 24   
income2 Boolean Annual income $25,000 to $49,999 115 25   
income3 Boolean Annual income ≥$50,000 233 51   
  Total 457 100   
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